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I 
Federal Finances and Inflation 
MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM 
Through its revenue-ra1smg, expenditure-disbursement, 
and related financial activities, the federal government takes a wide vari-
ety of actions that influence the rate of inflation experienced by the 
American economy. Some of these actions are deliberate and highly vis- . 
ible; others occur by default or escape public attention. In still other 
cases, the federal influence may be less direct, but have considerable ef-
fect. Confusion could result from this multiplicity of ways in which gov-
ernment fiscal policy affects the overall economy and especially the infla-
tion rate. This essay will analyze the many aspects of the question. 
The inflation that the United States now faces had its origin in deficit 
spending during the Vietnam war. The inflation has been accelerated and. 
extended by many other factors, ranging from wage-cost push to food 
and energy shortages. Yet the federal fiscal policy continues to aggra-
vate the inflation problem. Between 1965 and 1974, federal spending 
more than doubled; the cumulative budget deficit exceeded $100 billion, 
and it continues to increase. 
To begin with, an excess of government outgo over income increases 
the purchasing power available to the private sector. For a technical 
reason-the absence of "'saving" by the government--even a balanced 
budget tends to be mildly stimulative (as explained in the standard 
theorem of the "balanced budget multiplier"). Also, the revenues raised 
to cover expenditures, to the extent that they come out of funds that 
would otherwise be used for investment, have an adverse ef&ct because 
the nation loses the anti-inflationary benefits of a larger supply of goods 
and services. 
To some extent, the federal deficit is financed through sales of savings 
bonds and other securities to individuals and nonfinancial institutions. 
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The result will likely be so~e reduction in the funds available for con-
sumption, which helps offset the inflationary pressures resulting from the 
deficit spending. But to the extent that the purchases of federal securities 
reduce the funds ·that are available to finance private investment, the re-
sult may be a smaller increase than would otherwise occur in the stock 
of productive capital. 
However, a large proportion of the federal budget deficits is financed 
in a different way, through sales of Treasury debt to the banking sys-
tem. This is inflationary because it provides a direct basis for the mul-
tiple expansion of the money supply. Issuing more Treasury debt also 
exerts an upward pressure on interest rates as the government is not si-
multaneously increasing the supply of savings available for investment. 
It should be noted that it has become fashionable to downplay the 
role of federal fiscal policy and point to the power of monetary policy. 
Without entering the esoteric debate between "monetarists" and "fis-
calists," one should note an important development in the recent work 
of monetary theorists that focuses on the underlying causes of changes 
in the money supply. 
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, three related fac-
tors account for the progressive rise in the average growth of the money 
stock and, hence, a progressive rise in inflation: ( 1.) the sharp rise in the 
growth of government spending, (2) the resultant deficit financing and its 
accompanying upward pressure on interest rates, and (3) the response of 
the Federal Reserve System by increasing the money supply to soften 
the rise in interest rates. Although the relationship between fiscal policy 
and monetary policy may be more complex than that, this type of analy-
sis surely underscores the need to be concerned with federal fiscal policy 
in facing the overall question of inflation. 
Budgetary Subterfuges 
The analysis of federal fiscal policy has become esp~cially difficult be-
cause the government has increasingly resorted to subterfuges whereby 
certain categories of federal activity do not appear in the budget. It is 
pertinent but distressing to note that the official unified budget covers a 
shrinking part of federal spending. Students of federal budgeting, un-
fortunately, will not be surprised. The unified budget itself was devel-
oped because of the erosion of the old "administrative" or "convention-
al" budget, which came to omit the social. security trust funds and 
ultimately the federal-aid highway program. 
The current pressure to slow down the growth of federal spending has 
given a renewed impetus to efforts to "protect" a given government pro-
gram by making it less visible by excluding it from the budget totals. 
The phenomenon of the "off-budget" federal agencies is of recent ori-
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gin. The term was first introduced in January 1.974 in the federal budget 
for the fiscal year 1.975. It deserves some attention, because it is weaken-
ing the effectiveness of the unified budget as a comprehensive indicator 
of federal finance. 
First of all, this category does not include many items that seem to fit 
the title. It does not cover the government-chartered enterprises, such as 
the Federal Land Banks and the Federal National Mortgage Association, 
which have become privately owned in recent years. Since 1.967, when 
the federal government adopted the recommendations of the President's 
Commission on B.udget Concepts, these privately owned but govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises have been properly excluded from the federal 
budget. 
In contrast, the new category of "off-budget agencies" is limited to 
enterprises that are entirely federally owned and controlled. That is, 
the "off-budget agencies" are truly part of the federal government. 
They generally are staffed by civil servants and subject to all other fed-
eral operating procedures. The only thing that separates them from the 
agencies that are included in the budget is that Congress has passed laws 
which arbitrarily move their financial transactions out of the federal 
budget. 
The result is clear: both the total of federal expenditures and the 
budget deficit are lower than they would be if this arbitrary change had 
not occurred. It is noteworthy that when the Treasury reports the fed-
eral government's total borrowings from the public, the financial re-
quirements of these off-budget agencies are included. 
One characteristic that accompanies the achievement of "off-budget" 
status is expansion. For example, the first off-budget agency was the 
Export-Import Bank, which was excluded by statute as of August 1.7, 
1.971.. In the fi scal year 1.972, its lending totaled $249 million. The vol-
ume more than doubled to $630 million in 1.973 and is estimated to 
exceed $1..3 billion in 1.975. This upward trend contrasts with another 
wholly federal enterprise that has· remained in the budget, the Tennessee 
Valley Authority. TVA's net outlays declined from $448 million in 1.972 
to $367 million in 1.973 and are estimated to be $458 million in 1.975. 
Since 1.972, the Post Office (now the Postal Service) and the lending 
activities of the Rural Electrification Administration (now the Rural Tele-
phone Bank and the Rural Electrification and Telephone Revolving Fund) 
were removed from the budget. In fiscal1.973, the REA's net outlays were 
$528 million. By 1.975 its net lending-now outside of the budget-is 
estimated to reach $784 million; in addition, $1.9 million of adminis-
trative costs continue to appear in the budget. 
Several new wholly federal activities have been established since 1.972 
- the Environmental Financing Authority, the Federal Financing Bank, 
and the U.S. Railway Association- and their finances will be "off-budget." 
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Except in the case of the Pos~tal Service, the excluded outlays of the off-
budget agencies are for loan programs. These programs are similar in all 
substantive effects to the direct loan programs that are in the budget. 
Pending legislation would set up additional off-budget agencies, some in 
the lending area and others to make transfer payments or direct purchases 
of goods and services. One version of a proposed national health insur-
ance program (the Kennedy-Mills bill) would operate under a new off-
budget trust fund in the neighborhood of $30 billion a year. 
It is more difficult to obtain detailed information about the current 
and prospective operations of off-budget agencies than of agencies which 
are included in the budget. Table 1 brings together the data on off-budget 
agencies that are currently dispersed over a variety of special analyses 
which accompany the budget document. When the Railway Association 
gets under way, it is likely that its disbursements will push the total 
outlays of the off-budget agencies well beyond $3 billion a year. 
If any forecast on federal finance can be made with some confidence, it 
is that the number of the "off-budget agencies" and the size of their out-
lays will continue to grow rapidly in the future. Unless Congress sees 
the danger of this apparently painless way of government financing, the 
unified budget will become a less complete measure of the total flow of 
revenues and expenditures between the federal government and the pub-
lic. 
TABLE 1 
Outlays of Off-budget Federal Agencies 
(fiscal years, in millions of dollars) 
Amount Excluded from the Budget 
Agency 1970 1972 
Export-Import Bank 0 $249 
Postal Service'~ 0 0 
Rural Electrification Administration 0 0 
Environmental Financing Authority 0 0 
Rural Telephone Bank 0 . o 
Totalb 0 $249 
Source: Compiled by the author from various budget documents. 
aNet after receipt of subsidy of $1,533 million from budget funds. 
1975 
$1,250 
733 
463 
240 
135 
$2,821 
bEstimates not yet available for Federal Financing Bank and U.S. Railway Associa-
tion. 
Federal Credit Programs 
Credit programs are a second type of federal activity excluded from the 
budget. Programs in this group are loan guarantees, operations of fed-
erally sponsored enterprises, and similar uses of the government's credit 
power. So long as they are excluded from the budget, there is a strong in-
• 
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centive to convert federal spending to these indirect techniques, and this 
is being done on an increasing scale. Thus it is important to note the 
relationship between federal credit programs and the problem of infla-
tion. 
Over the years, many credit programs have been established by the 
federal government. Since most of these activities do not appear in the 
federal budget, they seem to be a painless way of achieving national ob-
jectives. In the main, the federal government is "merely" guaranteeing 
private borrowing or sponsoring ostensibly private institutions, albeit 
with federal aid. I;:xamples include the federal land banks and the fed-
eral home loan banks. 
Yet upon closer inspection one finds that this use of the governmen-
tal credit power does result in substantial costs to the society. First of 
all, these programs do little to increase the total pool of capital avail-
able to the economy. They result in a game of musical chairs. By pre-
empting a major portion of the annual flow of savings, the government-
sponsored credit agencies reduce the amount of credit that can be pro-
vided to unprotected borrowers (mainly consumers), state and local 
governments, and private business firms. 
During periods of tight money, it is difficult for unassisted borrowers 
to attract the financing that they require. They are forced to compete 
against the government-aided borrowers (a federal loan guarantee re-
duces the riskiness of lending money to the borrower who is so aided). 
The result of that uneven competition is still higher interest rates as in-
vestment funds are bid away from the unprotected sectors . 
This phenomenon occurs for a variety of reasons. The total supply of 
funds is broadly determined by household and business saving and the 
ability of banks to increase the money supply. The normal response of fi 
nancial markets to an increase in the demand for funds by a borrow-
er, such as that represented by a new federal credit program, is an in-
crease in interest rates to balance the demand for funds with the supply 
of saving. But the federal government's demand for funds is "interest-
inelastic" (the Treasury will generally raise the money that it requires 
regardless of the interest rate) and the interest-elasticity of saving is rel-
atively modest. Thus weak and marginal borrowers will be "rationed" 
out of financial markets in the process, while the Treasury and other 
borrowers pay higher rates of interest. 
There are also extra costs associated with introducing new govern-
ment credit agencies to the capital markets. Their issues are often smaller 
than those of the Treasury itself, and they only approximate the charac-
teristics of direct government debt, As a result of such considerations, 
the market normally charges a premium oxer the interest cost on direct 
government debt of comparable maturity. That premium ranges from 
0.25 percent on the well-known federally sponsored agencies, such as 
86 I MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM 
the Federal National Mortg~ge Association, to more than 0.5 percent 
on such exotic issues as New Community Bonds. 
The very nature of federal credit assistance is to create advantages for 
some groups of borrowers and disadvantages for others. The literature 
provides clear answers on who will tend to be rationed out in the pro-
cess. It is unlike!y to be the large well-known corporations or the United 
States government. It is more likely to be state and local governments, 
medium-sized and smaller businesses, · private mortgage borrowers not 
under the federal umbrella, and consumers. This is bound to contribute 
to additional economic and financial concentration in the United States. 
The competition for funds by the rapidly expanding federal credit pro-
grams also increases the cost to the taxpayer by raising the mterest rate 
at which the Treasury borrows its own funds. As shown in table 2, there 
TABLE 2 
Impact on Credit Markets of Federal and 
Federally Assisted Borrowing 
(fiscal years, in bi /lions of dollars) 
Category of Credit 1960 1965 1970 1971 1972 
A. Federal borrowing $ 2.2 $ 4.0 $ 5.4 $ 19.5 $ 19.4 
B. Federally assisted borrowing 
(off-budget)a $ 3 .3 $ 6.8 $15.1 ~ 18.2 $ 19.2 
c. Total federal and federally 
assisted borrowing (A + B) $ 5 .5 $10.8 $20.5 $ 37.7 $ 38.6 
D. Tot al funds advanced in 
credit markets $43.4 $69.6 $89.0 $120.0 $145.6 
E. = (C)+ (D) 12.7% 15.5% 23.0% 31.4% 26.5% 
Source: Federal Reserve System and U.S. Department of Treasury. 
aobligations issued by government-sponsored agencies or guaranteed by federal 
agencies. 
has been a massive expansion in the size and relative· importance of 
federal government credit demands over the past decade. In 1960, the fed-
eral share of funds raised in private capital markets, based on the Fed-
eral Reserve .System's flow-of-funds data, was 12.7 ·percent. By 1970, 
the government's share had risen to 23 percent, and has continued to 
grow. 
Virtually every session of the Congress in recent years has enacted 
additional federal credit programs. Since 1960, the Federal National Mort-
gage Association (Fannie Mae) has been joined by the General National 
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the Student Loan Marketing As-
sociation (Sally Mae), and, most recently, the U.S. Railway Associa-
tion (Fannie Rae). The upward trend is likely to continue. Proposals are 
now being seriously advanced for federal credit guarantees of private 
electric utility bonds and of bank deposits by local governments. 
Information on federal c.redit programs is contained in table 3· An 
' ~ 
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TABLE 3 
Major Federal Credit Programs, Fiscal Year 1974 
(new commitments, in millions of dollars) 
Government 
Direct Guaranteed Sponsored 
Category and Agency Loans Loans Enterprises Total 
Aid to Business 
Commerce $ 19 $ 255 $ 274 
Interior 19 35 54 
Transportation 50 1,143 1,193 
General Services Administration 20 483 503 
Emergency Loan Guarantee 
Board 60 60 
Export-Import Bank 7,039 $ 1,617 8,656 
Small Business Administration 249 2,703 2,952 
---
Subtotal $ 357 $11 ,718 $ 1,617 $13,692 
Aid to Farmers 
Agriculture $3,901 $ 2,870 $ 6,771 
Farm credit agencies $ 1,941 1,941 
Subtotal $3,901 $ 2,870 $ 1,941 $ 8,712 
Aid to Local Governments 
District of Columbia $ 270 $ 270 
Washington Metropolitan 
Transit Authority $ 334 334 
Environmental Financing 
" Authority $ 300 300 
Subtotal $ 270 $ 334 $ 300 $ 904 
Aid to Individuals 
Health, Education, and Welfare $ 132 $ 1,671 $ 1,803" 
Housing and Urban Development 15 15,269 15,284 
Veterans Administration 412 8 ,643 9,055 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board 10 $ 4,995 5,005 
Federal National Mortgage 
Association 3,354 3,354 
Subtotal $ 569 $25,583 $ 8,349 $34,501 
Miscellaneous 
Funds .appropriated to the 
president $1,125 $ 664 $ 1,789 
Other agencies 70 308 378 
Subtotal $1 I 195 $ 972 $ 2,167 
Total $6,292 $41,477 $12,207 $59,976 
Source: Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government for the F.iscal 
Year .1974. 
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examination of the array of programs is noteworthy. In the typical case, 
the area being aided is one subject to close federal regulation (transporta-
tion and agriculture) or has become, at least in part, a federal responsi-
bility (housing and vetera~s assistance). 
Reduced to its basics, federal credit programs really involve "putting 
the monkey on someone else's back." They do not increase the amount 
of investment funds available to the economy. Rather, they merely take 
capital funds away from other sectors of the economy and lead to similar 
requests for aid by those sectors. By raising the level of interest rates in 
the economy, for both private as well as government borrowers, they in-
crease an important element of the cost of production. The pressure on 
interest rates in turn often forces the Federal Reserve System to increase 
the reserves of the banking system to supply financing to the private sec-
tor. This increase, in turn, contributes to the general inflationary con-
dition of the economy. 
Federal Procurement Activities 
The specific operations of public programs can also exert inflationary 
pressures. Through its procurement powers, the federal government can 
impose extra costs on the firms that supply it with goods and services. 
The magnitude of the government's procurement outlays and partic-
ularly their importance to government-oriented firms create opportuni-
ties for implementing a variety of economic and social aims through 
the contract mechanism. The federal government thus requires that firms 
doing business with it maintain "fair" employment practices, provide 
"safe" and 11healthful" working conditions, pay "prevailing" wages, 
refrain from polluting the air and water, give preference to American 
products in their purchases, and promote the rehabilitation of prisoners 
and the severely handicapped. This required "social responsibility" in-
creases the costs of goods and services that government agencies, as well 
as others, purchase from the private sector. 
The advantage of using government contracts to promote basic social 
policies is apparent. Important national objectives may be fostered 
without the need for additional, direct appropriations from the Trea-
sury. To a congressman, this may seem a painless and simple approach. 
Because restrictive procurement provisions seem to be costless, the gov-
ernment has been making increasing uses of them. Any disadvantages, 
being more indirect, receive less attention. 
Yet, upon reflection, these special provisions are all burdens on the 
governmental procurement process. They increase overhead expenses of 
private contractors and federal procurement offices alike. Many of the 
provisions also exert an upward pressure on the direct costs incurred by 
· the government. For example, special provisions such as the Davis-Ba-
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con Act increase the cost of public construction projects through gov-
ernment promulgation of wage rates higher than those that would have 
resulted if the market were allowed to operate without impediment. 
Federally Imposed Costs 
The federal government's imposition of costs on the private sector is not 
limited to the case of government contractors, although that is where the 
phenomenon is most apparent. In part because of efforts to control the 
growth of government spending, the federal government now increas-
ingly relies on mechanisms that are designed to achieve a given national 
objective-better working conditions or more nutritious foods-without 
spending much government money for the purpose. The current approach 
is to emphasize the alternative of influencing private decision making to 
achieve the same ends. 
Thus, rather than the public treasury bearing the full burden of clean-
ing up environmental pollution, private firms are required to devote more 
resources to that purpose. Rather than the federal government spend-
ing large sums of money to eliminate traffic hazards, motorists are re-
quired to purchase more expensive vehicles which reduce the likelihood 
of serious injuries resulting from traffic accidents. At first glance, having 
the government impose some socially desirable requirement on the pri-
vate sector appears to be an inexpensive way of achieving national 
objectives. It does not cost the government anything and therefore is 
no burden on the taxpayer. But, on reflection, it can be seen that the 
public does not escape paying the cost. 
Every time that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
imposes a more costly, though safer, method of production, the cost of 
the resultant product will of necessity tend to rise. Every time that the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission imposes a standard that is more 
costly to attain, some product costs will tend to rise. The same holds true 
for the activities of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and 
Drug Administration, and so forth. The price of the typical new 197 4 
passenger automobile was about $320 higher than it would have been 
in the absence of federally mandated safety and environmental require-
ments. 
The point is not the worthiness of the objectives of these agencies. 
Rather, it is 'that "there is no free lunch" for the public in following the 
procedure of imposing public requirements on private industry. Al-
though the costs are not borne by the taxpayer directly, in large measure 
they are reflected in the higher prices of the goods and services that con-
sumers buy. Even though most government regulation of business is de-
signed to benefit the consuming public, it is the consumer who ultimately 
suffers the price increases that result. Although the manufacturer or dis-
90 I MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM 
tributor may initially bear the expense of destroying products declared 
hazardous, much of the added cost will inevitably be passed on to the 
public in the form of higher prices. 
These fiscal "shortcuts"-imposing the costs of achieving national 
objectives directly on the private sector rather than financing them via 
taxation-are not part of any conscious new policy to increase the rate 
of inflation. But, intentionally or not, they do have that effect with the 
continued increase in government-mandated costs of production. 
Summary and Conclusion 
As this study attempts to show, the federal government can exert an in-
flationary force on the economy in many ways, some even unintention-
al. An important step in formulating more effective anti-inflationary 
policies is to improve the public understanding of those governmental 
actions that tend to make for more inflation. By way of a brief summary, 
the following are the different ways in which government financial ac-
tions can have an inflationary impact on the economy: 
• The federal government can increase inflationary pressures by injecting 
more purchasing power into the economy via government spending 
than it withdraws via taxation. 
• Specific types of government expenditures can be especially inflation-
ary, notably procurement methods which result in increased costs of 
production. 
• Specific types of taxation can have an adverse impact to the extent that 
they withdraw private funds that otherwise would have been devoted 
to increasing productive capacity. 
• Some methods of deficit financing may be especially inflationary, to 
the extent that they result in sales of government securities to the bank-
ing system and provide the basis for a multiple expansion of the money 
supply. 
• Subterfuges that underestimate the actual amount of federal spending 
-such as the so-called "off-budget agencies"-can lead to a more 
stimulating fiscal policy than is desired. 
• Expanding use of the government's credit power can result in rising 
interest costs to both the Treasury and private borrowers and also force 
further increases in the money supply. 
• Expanding use of the government's regulatory power can shift costs of 
achieving national objectives from the public sector to the private 
sector. Although such actions may improve the nominal state of the 
federal budget, the resultant higher costs of production exacerbate the 
underlying inflationary pressures. 
